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 The Evolution of Wealth Distribution in a Model
of Educational Investment with Heterogenous
Agents.
Marcello D’Amato
Universit` a di Salerno, Celpe, Csef, Dises;
Christian Di Pietro
Universit` a di Salerno, Dises
Abstract
The implications of individual heterogeneity for the evolution of
wealth distribution are studied in a standard model of occupational
choice with ﬁnancial market imperfections and local non convexities
in education investment technology. We consider heterogeneity in the
cost of educational investment, interpreted as genetic variation at the
level of lineage. Ergodicity of the wealth distribution is obtained when-
ever the (exogenous) distribution of education costs entails the pres-
ence of ability types for which the educational investment is inefﬁcient
vis a vis ﬁnancial investment, regardless of how ”large” the support
is. Conversely, poverty traps can emerge only if investment is efﬁcient
for every single agent in the economy. We show that under quite gen-
eral conditions, the accumulation of wealth at the lineage level does
not eliminate ﬁnancial market imperfections over the long run, motivat-
ing our exploration of policy implications. In particular heterogeneity
requires more persitent policies to achieve similar results as in the
standard case. On the other hand policies can be effective in environ-
ments where they would fail under the assumption of homogeneous
costs.
JEL classiﬁcation: D31, D91, I21, J24, O15
Keywords : Intergenerational Mobility, Inequality Dynamics, Occupational
Choice, Educational Investment, Borrowing Constraints
56Introduction
Poverty traps arising from many sorts of market failures represent one of
the inﬂuential analytical frameworks to understand persistence of large dif-
ferences in the performance of householdsin the labormarket and economies
on the development path. Such persistence is considered as inconsistent
with the outcome of more standard models in which perfect markets efﬁ-
ciently govern temporary reversal of fortunes of households or countries,
although the empirical relevance of the theoretical construct is debated
(Azariadis and Stachursky, 2006, Ravallion, 2006). The analysis of the
microstructure of a poverty trap and its aggregate consequences has also
been an inﬂuential framework for policy design (see Barret et al., 2008 and
references therein) since it is deemed to establish the relevance and to clar-
ify scope and power of temporary policies to achieve permanent objectives.
Subject to a proper scale dictated by ﬁscal budget constraints and provided
that individual state (usually wealth) is observed by the policy maker, policy
interventions are easy to enforce featuring a very nice property: once bro-
ken the jaws of the trap, policy and the enforcing public institutions become
irrelevant and can disappear.
Whether indivisibility and threshold effects induced by ﬁnancial market
imperfections are relevant features of actual economies and how the an-
swer to this question changes in time and space, what is the role of individ-
ual heterogeneity and family altruism in making the assessment pending to-
wards ergodicity or not of the actual dynamics of wealth distribution is a dif-
ﬁcult empirical question (Azariadis and Stachursky, 2006, Ravallion, 2006).
Our starting point is simply that ﬁnancial market imperfections are particu-
larly relevant for educational investment where also indivisibilities can mat-
ter, both ingredients are typical sources of poverty traps and have been
widely analyzed. Our aim is to investigate in some detail the role of hetero-
geneity for the evolution of wealth and for policy design in a standard model
(with no interaction between wealth distribution and factor prices) of educa-
tional investment with indivisibilities and ﬁnancial market imperfections. We
consider heterogeneity in the cost of education investment, interpreted as
genetic variation at the level of a lineage. In this context we explore the role
of heterogeneity addressing three issues: i. the implications for the evolu-
tion of wealth distribution; ii. if and under which conditions ﬁnancial market
imperfections are overcome by the accumulation of wealth at the lineage
level; iii. what, if any, is the role for policy in this context.
Clearly individual characteristics, in the context of educational invest-
ment and occupational choice, can induce further occupational mobility
than that usually obtained in standard models of poverty traps (Gal Or and
Zeira, 1993), producing similar dynamics as in models of mobility traps
(Piketty, 1997 and Aghion and Bolton, 1997) and in models of short term
persistence of wealth distributions (Becker and Tomes, 1979, and Loury
71981). With heterogeneity the speciﬁc outcome in terms of long run wealth
distribution depend, via ﬁnancial market imperfections, on the possibility for
agents at the bottom of wealth distribution to ﬁnance upward occupational
mobility, turning on the engine of wealth accumulation in a family lineage.
The emergence of poverty traps will, therefore, depend on whether or not
the race between individual ability and ﬁnancial market imperfections allow
lineages, sooner or later in their history, to cope with the indivisibility in
investment.
It may seem that if wealth constraints are not binding for a positive frac-
tion of agents, regardless of their wealth background, the mismatch be-
tween ability (the exogenously random element in the rate of return to edu-
cational investment) and the distribution of wealth (as a source of ﬁnance in
a world of ﬁnancial market imperfections) is transitory. As a result, as time
goes by, an ergodic distribution of wealth is shaped, ﬁnancial imperfections
are overcome by wealth accumulation. The scope for policy, if any, is to
tackle ﬁnancial problems at the bottom range of the wealth distribution to
trigger or accelerate the process of occupational mobility.
However, even if the presence of a gifted agent in a poor lineage can
always trigger upward occupational and wealth mobility, it does not nec-
essarily imply, as it happens instead in the case of homogeneous agents
once the threshold level of wealth is reached, that ﬁnancial market imper-
fections become irrelevant in any history. In that case the race between
random elements of luck and indivisibilities would be won by the former in
the long run making ﬁnancial market imperfections a transitory problem in
the development process.
The point is that heterogeneity, possibly entailing the presence of low
ability types, may trigger downward occupational and therefore downward
wealth mobility in skilled households, setting the conditions for the continu-
ous bite of ﬁnancial market imperfections on investment choice and, possi-
bly, a scope for policy.1
Whether or under which conditions ergodicity of the wealth distribution
is related to the progressive elimination of ﬁnancial market imperfection is,
therefore, less clear and deserves some attention on its own right.
Our analysis is conducted in a simple economic environment: a small
open economy is considered where the size of indivisibilities, ﬁnancial mar-
ket imperfections and returns to factors are set exogenously in the competi-
tive equilibrium (i.e. we study a non interactive model of wealth distribution).
1Financial market imperfections are doomed to persist in the long run whenever non
insurable shocks (not considered in this paper) hit the returns to investment. See for exam-
ple Loury (1981), Banerjee and Newman (1991), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Piketty (1997).
The interaction of wealth accumulation at the lineage level can serve both as a source of
ﬁnance in the presence of credit market imperfections and as insurance device, whenever
moral hazard aspects in productionpreventcomplete insurance of idiosyncraticshocks. Our
focus is on the former.
8Of course the bite of ﬁnancial market imperfections evolve with the accumu-
lation of wealth at the lineage level, not with the state of the aggregate
economy. The model is, therefore, an ideal setting for a simple but detailed
accounting of occupational and wealth mobility ﬂows and their implications
for aggregate investment and growth. In this context, the dynamics are
shown to be quite different depending on whether ability distribution entails
or not an inefﬁcient type for whom the ﬁnancial bequest is preferable as an
alternative to educational investment. In particular, we show that poverty
traps disappear whenever the distribution of education costs entails the
presence of ability types for which the educational investment is inefﬁcient
vis a vis an alternative ﬁnancial investment available in the economy. The
result holds regardless of how ”large” the support of the distribution of abili-
ties is. Moreover, and more importantly for the motivation of our exploration
of policy issues, the disappearance of poverty trap does not necessarily im-
ply the irrelevance of wealth constraints on investment in a steady state with
occupational mobility. It is still possible that ﬁnancial market imperfections
bind investment decisions over the long run. Actually, we show that in our
economy, if at a single point in time a single lineage is constrained, ﬁnancial
market imperfections cannot disappear in the long run at any steady state
with occupational mobility. Relatedly, it holds that whenever the observed
frequency of investment in skilled households correlates, at any point in
time, with wealth background, then ﬁnancial market imperfections can not
disappear, even in the long run.
Conversely, a poverty trap can emerge only if investment is efﬁcient for
every single agent in the economy, that is when ﬁxed costs are ”small” (i.e.
when a given rate of return on educational investment are large compared
to education costs). Traps will emerge (of course) provided that wealth ac-
cumulation in the traditional sector converges below the minimum threshold
required for investment and the middle class is not constrained by wealth
in its investment choices. Whether ﬁnancial market imperfections are oper-
ative for households in the skilled sector, is crucial for the long run equilib-
rium: when both householdsin the unskilled sectors are trapped and middle
class (less wealthy agents in the skilled sector) are constrained for some of
their ability types the economy declines towards stagnation in the traditional
sector. In this case it also holds that occupational mobility at steady state
imply the persistence of ﬁnancial market imperfections over the long run.
The possibility that, with heterogeneity, wealth accumulation does not
eliminate ﬁnancial market imperfection over the long run is one of the mo-
tivations for our investigation of policy design in this environment, when a
more direct intervention on ﬁnancial market imperfections is not available
as a policy instrument.
It is well known that local indivisibilities and the failure of ﬁnancial mar-
kets form an economic environment where the initial distribution can matter.
9Equivalently, temporary (both structural and policy) shocks can have per-
manent effects in this environment. Then redistributive policies can have
permanent effects on investment, equality of opportunity and per capita in-
come. An example of the effectiveness of policies arises in the case of
homogeneous agents: if average wealth in the economy (or the scale of
outside intervention through external resources) is large enough ”one shot
redistribution policies can have permanent effects”, both for the elimination
of the poverty trap and for the role of policy response to transitory adverse
shocks. This view about the role of transitory policies in environments ex-
hibiting poverty traps has been challenged in models where long run inter-
vention is required by the emergence of so called mobility traps (see Piketty,
2000, for a survey), similar conclusions are suggested by Mookherjee and
Napel (2007) in a model with heterogeneity and endogenous factor prices.
With this debate in mind, we address the implications of heterogeneity for
the design of effective policies aimed at increasing educational investment,
per capita output and social mobility in a standard environment with indivis-
ibilities.
In particular we show that, in a well deﬁned sense, models with het-
erogeneity call for more persistent policies, arising, essentially from the im-
possibility for the policy maker to observe agents’ ability type and targeting
the transfer scheme accordingly. More importantly we also show that redis-
tributive policies can be effective in environments where they would not be
under the assumption of homogeneouscosts. In particular, we characterize
a set of conditions on the distribution of abilities such that a permanent pol-
icy is effective even when economic fundamentals would dictate a declining
path: intuitively heterogeneity in ability provides additional opportunities for
redistributing resources when ﬁnancial market fail.
The role of heterogeneity is brieﬂy discussed in Gal Or and Zeira (1993)
on which we heavily draw for the modeling of the economic environment.
There it is stated that provided that the variability of the individual (ex-post)
non insurable shock (wages) is not too large poverty traps are still obtained.
Our analysis spells out all the emerging equilibrium conﬁgurations, and in-
vestigates some policy implications in greater detail for the slightly different
case of ex-ante heterogeneity.
The work by Mookherjee and Napel (2007) analyzes the role of hetero-
geneityin shapingintergenerationalmobility in the context of a modelwhere
pecuniary externalities to educational investment arise due to the presence
of standard decreasing returns to scale technology in both the modern and
the traditional sector. They provide results and open important questions,
some of which motivated our analysis here. Their analysis is conducted
on the assumption that investment costs always ensure downward occupa-
tional mobility in skilled households. This latter assumption, coupled with
the assumption of positive occupational mobility at the bottom of the wealth
10distribution, entails the shrinking of the set of steady state from a contin-
uum to a ﬁnite number, in a model with no ﬁnancial bequest motive. Our
analysis, conducted in a simpler model with exogenous returns to factor,
can be seen as an exploration, without restricting the cost distribution a
priori, of similar issues for the evolution of wealth distribution, which is im-
portant for establishing whether the accumulation of wealth process at the
level of a lineage can, and to what extent, eliminate, wealth constraints on
households investment choice. They also brieﬂy discuss policy implications
arguing for the role of persistent policies, due to multiple equilibria. We ar-
rive at a similar conclusions, but the argument is different and it holds under
ergodicity.
The relationship of our analysis to models generating”low mobility traps”
(as in Piketty, 1997, see, Piketty 2000, for a survey) is weak since the main
impact of initial distribution of wealth in these models works via the en-
dogenous accumulation of aggregate capital and the determination of the
interest rate, which is instead ﬁxed in our model. The policy implications
of heterogeneity, however, remind some of the conclusions drawn in these
models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we lay out the
model, specializing the main features in Gal-Or and Zeira to the case of no
ﬁnancial markets for human capital investment, moreover we analyze the
benchmark case of homogeneous investment costs and discuss some im-
plications for policy design with a focus on the two points discussed in this
section, in section 3 we discuss the results about the dynamics of wealth
distributions and occupational mobility in the case of heterogeneous invest-
ment costs, in section 4 we discuss the implications of heterogeneity for
policy design. Section 5 discusses some extensions and section 6 con-
cludes. All the proofs are reported in the Appendix.
1 The model
Our model economy is very similar to that considered in Gal-Or and Zeira
(1993) except for two features: there is no ﬁnancial market whatsoever for
educational investment and, more importantly, there is heterogeneity in the
investment cost. The ﬁrst feature is just a simpliﬁcation and it does not
affect the results (see Piketty 2000, pp.459 and ss.), the second represents
the speciﬁc focus of our investigation.
Speciﬁcally, we consider a small open economy where a single good
can be produced with two technologies, using skilled labor and physical
capital in one case and unskilled labor in the other case. In the sector





t is output, Kt is the amount of physical capital, Ls
t is the
amount of skilled labor employed in production, F(.) is a homogeneous
function of degree one.




i.e. returns to unskilled labor (v) are assumed to be constant. The
hypothesis of small open economy and homogeneity of degree one of F
imply that returns to capital (r) and skilled labor (w) are constant as well.
Firms do not face ﬁnancial market imperfection.
The economy is populated by agents whose measure is normalized to
1 in every period t. Agents derive utility from their own consumption and
bequest to their offspring according to:
Ut = αlogct + (1 − α)logbt con α ∈ (0,1) (3)
where ct denotes consumption and bt denotes the bequest, α ∈ (0,1) is
a (inverse) measure of altruism within lineages.
Each agent, given the inherited bequest, has to decide whetherto invest
in human capital or not and how much to bequeath to her own offspring; the
budget constraint is given by
ct + bt = (1 + r)(bt−1 − e   x) + ye (4)
where e ∈ {0,1} summarizes the indivisibility in human capital invest-
ment, capturing non convexities in the investment technology that vary at
the individual level. If e = 0 agents do not invest in human capital and
y0 = v. If e = 1 the agent bear the cost of investment x and she works as
skilled yielding a wage y1 = w.
We modelﬁnancialmarket imperfection simply as non existence of credit
market (Loury, 1981, Mookherjee and Ray, 2003) for human capital invest-
ment, i.e. investment choices are subject to wealth constraints as follows:
Assumption 1. (Financial Market Imperfection) bt−1 ≥ e   x.
The investment cost is heterogeneous across individuals in a given gen-
eration, so that it holds:
Assumption 2. (Heterogeneity in Investment Costs) x, a measure of ability,
is a random variable distributed according to G(x) on the support ∆x =
[x,x], with x ≥ 0 and average xe =
R x
x xdG(x).
Assumption 2 captures the presence of indivisibilities in education in-
vestment (local non convexity) but adds heterogeneity as in Mookherjee
and Napel (2007). Notice that heterogeneity in investment costs is such
12that each agent makes investment decisions based on an individual spe-
ciﬁc cost that does not depend on the inherited wealth (and therefore is
independent on her ancestors’ ability). Of course ancestor’s ability affect
their offspring’s investment through bequeathed wealth.
For stability we require that:
Assumption 3. (Stability) ρ := (1 + r)(1 − α) < 1.
Simple algebra shows that lifetime resources is allocated between con-
sumption and bequest as follows:
ct(e) = α[(1 + r)(bt−1 − e   x) + ye] (5)
bt(e) = (1 − α)[(1 + r)(bt−1 − e   x) + ye] (6)
with bt−1 ≥ e   x.
By substituting (5) and (6) into (3) we get the indirect utility as a function
of e, given bt−1 and xt
Ut(e) = log((1 + r)(bt−1 − e   x) + ye) + ǫ
where ǫ := αlogα + (1 − α)log(1 − α).
Due to indivisibility agents choose investment by solving:
Max
e
{Ut(e = 0),Ut(e = 1)} (7)
s.to bt−1 ≥ e   x
where:
Ut(e = 0) = log((1 + r)bt−1 + v) + ǫ (8)
Ut(e = 1) = log((1 + r)(bt−1 − x) + w) + ǫ (9)
It is easy to see that the solution to (7) entails a cut off level for x; more-
over, such level depends on whether the wealth constraint is binding or not.
In households where wealth constraints are not binding, equate (8) and (9)
and get the value of x such that:




In households where wealth constraints are binding investment occurs
whenever x ≤ bt−1.
Summarizing the solution to the human capital investment problem in
each lineage we state:
13Remark 1. Educational investment occurs (e = 1) if and only if
x ≤ min{˜ x,bt−1} (11)
Intuitively, Remark 1 states that both the individual cost of investment
and inherited wealth affect, in general, the choice of investment. Uncon-
strained agents (b > x) will invest whenever the rate of returns on human
capital investment is larger than the rate of returns of ﬁnancial market; i.e.
e = 1 for x < ˜ x. Constrained agents’ investment is, instead, limited by ﬁ-
nancial market imperfection2. Also intuitively, for given distributions of x and
b the demand for investment in human capital increases when the rate of
return on education increases (the skill premium w − v is larger) and when
the return on ﬁnancial wealth decrease (1 + r is lower).
Notice that, from (6) it is easy to see that the Markov system of family
decisions deﬁnes a ”non interactive dynamics” of the evolution of wealth
distribution: the history of each lineage does not depend neither on the
measure of that lineage nor on the measure of any other lineage in the
economy. This allows us to study separately the dynamics of bequest in
each lineage and the induced measure of given wealth interval. Given
these features, the competitive equilibrium is simply obtained by aggregat-
ing individual choices. Therefore the competitive equilibrium of our model is
an evolution of measures on the admissible set of bequests (as for example
in Loury, 1981, Becker and Tomes, 1979, Piketty and Aghion and Bolton)
induced by an initial distribution and the equilibrium investment decisions
made as above.
In particular, individual decisions are such that the optimal allocation
of lifetime income between consumption and bequests as described by (5)
and (6) and the optimal investment choice as described in (7) by each agent.
Agents will differ depending on x and bt−1. The structure of family decisions
making deﬁned by (5), (6), (7) (since they are all functions of the state bt−1)
allows us to study the evolution of the economy as a Markov process3.
Therefore the object of analysis is the evolution of a random variable  t(b)
describing the distribution of bequests at each period t induced by  t−1(b),
the past distribution at t − 1 given exogenous prices in factor markets and
other parameters of the model. The set of all exogenous parameters is
denoted as Γ = {α,r,w,v,G(x)}.
The aim of the analysis is to establish whether and under which condi-
tions on Γ the evolution of wealth distributions  (b) exhibits or not ergodicity
with respect to  0(.) and derive some policy implications.
2Notice that constrained agents have strictly larger rate of return than the unconstrained
in the human capital investment.
3See the appendix for a formal proof that the evolution of our economy follows a Markov
process. The result is easily obtained by suitably adapting arguments in Loury (1981).
14Before studying the model with heterogeneity it is convenient to review
some results on the model in the absence of heterogeneity as a useful
benchmark. This will both help the intuition of our main results in the anal-
ysis of the evolution of the economy with heterogenous agents and in the
analysis of the role of redistributive policies.
1.1 The benchmark case of homogeneous costs of investment
As it is well known, in the case of homogenous agents a few conﬁgura-
tions emerge for the long run equilibrium depending on the forces that allow
households to eliminate ﬁnancial market imperfections through asset accu-
mulation (returns on ﬁnancial wealth, altruism, labor income and investment
costs). The analysis of the dynamic evolution emerging for homogeneous
costs will be important for describing the dynamics of different households
in the case of heterogeneity and constitute a useful benchmark.
Our benchmark is constructed, without loss of generality and for a rea-
son that will be clear in the discussion of policies, so that the homogenous
cost of investment is equal to the average cost xe.
In this case, by Remark 1 the solution to (7) is e = 1 for xe ≤ b and
e = 0 otherwise. Notice ﬁrst that for xe > e x the investment technology
is inefﬁcient4, e = 0 and φ(b; xe) = (1 − α)v + ρb, this case is trivial and
disregarded.
For xe ≤ e x investment is efﬁcient i.e. every agent would invest if feasi-
ble. The outcome depends on how family altruism and the storing technol-
ogy (1 + r) allow households to circumvent ﬁnancial market imperfections
sooner or later and in their history along the wealth accumulation path, for
the given value of x. By remark 1 it is straightforward to conclude that
with homogenous costs the dynamics of wealth are governed by the map
φ : bt−1 → bt deﬁned as follows:
φ(b; xe) =
￿
φu(b; xe) := (1 − α)v + ρb xe > b
φs(b; xe) := (1 − α)w + ρ(b − xe) xe ≤ b
(12)
where the time subscript is eliminated for the subsequent exposition, to
simplify the notation. Notice that the mapping φ(b; xe) is stepwise linear
increasing, with slope ρ and it exhibits a discontinuity at b = xe, the wealth
threshold. Also notice that occupational and bequest choice are two as-
pects of the same phenomenon, i.e. whenever wealth is above a threshold
xe the household member is employed in the skilled sector forever on and
the accumulation equation is governed by φs. Occupational mobility ﬂows
exactly mirror mobility ﬂows in the wealth distribution. This is implied by the
fact that in a world of homogeneous costs either the investment is efﬁcient
4The cost of investment is larger than the discounted present value of the return on
investment.
15or it is not for every single agent in the economy. Then mobility ﬂows are
regulated by inherited wealth (in the form of a threshold b = xe) rather than
by credit markets, ability does not play any role in the long run. 5
In particular, three possible equilibrium conﬁgurations emerge from the
analysis of the homogeneous cost case, summarized in the following:
Lemma 1. Fix xe so that xe < e x, deﬁne FP as the set of ﬁxed points of φ,
denote bs = (1 − α)w, b =
(1−α)v
1−ρ . Then FP is characterized as follows:
i) (Decline) If xe > bs, then FP = {b};












Case 1. and 2. are ergodic, in case 3. the measure of skilled agent
converging to either of the two steady state wealth levels depends on the
initial distribution of wealth.
This result is well known (e. g. Gal-Or and Zeira, 1993) but some com-








5This aspect of the model with homogeneous investment cost will be lost in general in
the case of heterogeneity: in the latter case the transition from one occupation to the other
(both upward and downward) is not necessarily regulated permanently by the threshold xe
in wealth. With heterogeneity in investment costs the law governing the evolution of wealth
within family will be regulated by both the position in the wealth distribution and by the
random draw of ability by members of the lineage in each generation, both in the form of
thresholds, due to indivisibilities of investment.
16Figure 1 (decline). Type B0 := xe > bs
Case 1. (Decline). Consider bs the minimum level of wealth that can
be bequeathed by a member of the skilled sector, if bs < xe , bs must be
reached in ﬁnite time by any lineage in that sector and then a straightfor-
ward implication of (7) is e = 0 in the next and every subsequent genera-
tion. Every lineage is doomed to pass through state bs then the economy
converges to a unique steady state, b, regardless of the initial distribution
of wealth. Financial market imperfections in this case are not countervailed
by family altruism and have such a severe impact that they will end up to
constrain investment in every lineage in the economy in the long run (a
scenario we label decline). Both downward and upward wealth mobility
ﬂows can be observed in the transition, depending on the initial distribution,
although, after a ﬁnite number of periods the unskilled becomes the only






Figure 2: (Self-sustaining growth). Type B2 := xe < b
Case 2 (Self sustaining growth). If xe < b then lineages in the unskilled
sector will be unconstrained in ﬁnite time, thereafter upward occupational









Figure 3 (Poverty traps). Type B1 := b ≤ xe ≤ bs
6.
Case 3 (Poverty trap) For b ≤ xe ≤ bs a straightforward implication of
(7) is e = 1 for b ≥ xe in a given period, then the same will hold in the next
and any subsequent generation in such lineage, downward occupational
mobility will never occur: households in the skilled sector are unconstrained
(xe ≤ bs), householdsin the traditionalsector are constrained in the long run
(b ≤ xe). No occupational mobility can occur in the transition, some upward
and downward mobility in wealth can be observed in the transition. Multiple
steady states (the measure of agents in each sector) arise depending on
the initial distribution of wealth.
2 The evolution of wealth distribution in the pres-
ence of heterogeneity
In this section we analyze the dynamics of the model under Assumption 2.
With heterogeneity, the implicit rate of return on investment is spread across
individuals in a given generation according to the distribution function of x
which, provided that wealth constraints are not binding, will be the source
for upward and downward occupational mobility within lineages and for the
induced mobility in wealth.
Equilibrium bequest and investment policies, for any given individual
state (b, x), are deﬁned by the map Φ as follows:
6Observe that:
(1−α)w−ρx
1−ρ ≥ bs whenever xe ≤ bs
18Deﬁnition1. For a given x, deﬁne Φ(b; x) := ArgMax
b,e
{Ut(e = 0),Ut(e = 1)},
where Ut(e = 0) and Ut(e = 1) are deﬁned as in (8) and (9).




Φu := (1 − α)v + ρb x > min{˜ x,b}, e = 0
Φs := (1 − α)w + ρ(b − x) x ≤ min{˜ x,b}, e = 1
(13)
Observe that Φ is a correspondence b → Φ(b), where Φ(b) is the set
of equilibrium bequest achievable by agents who received b, for different
values of x.
By studying Φ(b; x) a ﬁrst characterization of the limit support of wealth
distribution, denoted by S∞, is obtained. Deﬁne B := [b, b], where b =
(1−α)v
1−ρ and b =
(1−α)w−ρx
1−ρ . Notice that B is the smaller convex set containing
the set of ﬁxed point of Φ. It holds the following:
Lemma 2. Suppose the support of the initial distribution of wealth, S0, is
bounded then the sequence {Sn} converges to a unique limit set S∞ ⊂ B.
The result establishes that there exists a compact set such that the sup-
port of the limit distribution takes values in it. This set has not necessarily
full measure on the borel sets with respect to B. Which subsets of B will
feature positive measure it will depend on the evolution of wealth distribu-
tion as shaped by the parameters of the model which we now study. To
this aim it is immediate to see that, again, three possibilities can emerge,
depending on the rate of returns on human capital investment in the popu-
lation as dictated by the support ∆x of the distribution G(x), i.e. depending
on whether ˜ x < ∆x, ˜ x ∈ ∆x, ˜ x > ∆x. If ˜ x < ∆x human capital technology
is inefﬁcient, the economy trivially converges to b.
1. For ˜ x ∈ ∆x the rate of return of educational investment belongs to set
of admissible investment costs. Individual variation of ability, regard-
less of inherited wealth, is such that in every lineage at any point in
time there may exist both efﬁcient and inefﬁcient types. Occupational
mobility ﬂows, in this case, are regulated by both the (endogenous)
process for the evolution of wealth and the exogenous process gener-
ating abilities. Economies satisfying this condition will always feature
inefﬁcient agents and efﬁcient agents that are constrained in their in-
vestment choice due to ﬁnancial market imperfections. With ﬁnancial
market imperfections occupational mobility ﬂows interact with wealth
mobility. We denote this as a case of intermediate ﬁxed costs.
2. For ˜ x > ∆x the rate of return of educational investment is greater
than all investment costs, the modern sector is efﬁcient for any pos-
sible x. Then every agent faces an efﬁcient investment technology,
19occupational mobility ﬂows are regulated by wealth constraints alone.
In this case the fundamental features of the ability process are similar
to the case generating poverty traps in the homogeneous cost case.
We denote this as a case of low ﬁxed costs.
Case 1 and 2 above are studied separately in the following two subsec-
tions.
2.1 The evolution of wealth distribution in the case of interme-
diate ﬁxed costs (˜ x ∈ ∆x)
In this case the set of admissible x includes both efﬁcient and inefﬁcient
agents. The task of the market economy is to allocate individual talent x
to an occupation in one of the two sectors. Recall that from equation (7)
inefﬁcient agents x > ˜ x will not invest (e = 0) whereas efﬁcient agents will







Figure 4. Image set of b under Φ in the case of Intermediate Costs
(Decline)
In ﬁgure 4 we report Φ(b; x) in the case of intermediate costs. The
green area represents the set of bequeathed wealth by agents employed
in the skilled sector. The red line represents the set of bequeathed wealth
by agents in the unskilled sector. One important topological property is
that the two sets are connected for b ≥ ˜ x. 7 The economic counterpart of
7Notice that ˜ x is, by deﬁnition, the value of x such that the agent is indifferent between
investing and not investing regardless of wealth. Therefore at x = ˜ x the equilibriumbequest
20this property is that any lineage starting from b ≥ ˜ x does not face wealth
constraints regardless of her immediate ancestor’s occupation. Conversely
for b < ˜ x any lineage has a non zero probability to face a wealth constraint
(for efﬁcient agents) regardless of occupation. 8
The evolution of wealth distribution in the case of intermediate ﬁxed
costs is characterized in the following
Proposition 1. For ˜ x ∈ ∆x the dynamic of the evolution of wealth distribu-
tions is ergodic (with respect to  0). Moreover only two wealth distributions
emerge, depending on Γ:
i) (Decline) if b ≤ x, then the dynamics of the wealth distributions con-
verge to b with full measure;
ii) (Self Sustaining Growth with Social and Occupational Mobility) if x <
b, then the system converges to [b, b] with a unique measure  ∗.
In words, the proposition states that if the exogenous process determin-
ing individual variation in x regulates occupational mobility ﬂows and ﬁnan-
cial market imperfections only constrain investment choice at the bottom of
wealth distribution then poverty traps disappear, the system is ergodic. A
more worrisome scenario of decline can be part of the equilibrium conﬁgu-
ration.
Sooner or later, in ﬁnite time, every household in the upper segments
of the wealth distribution is doomed to end up below the wealth threshold
that allows to invest. The destiny of wealthy households is only transitorily
separated from that of the poor.
The intuition is straightforward: if there always exists an inefﬁcient type
independently of the level of parental wealth, there will always exist down-
ward occupational mobility ﬂows in any range of the wealth distribution.
Consequently any lineage can always experience a large enough number
of bad draws, after which their wealth converges to a neighborhood of b. To
achieve a stable limit distribution with mobility (and to avoid decline) these
downward mobility ﬂows must be mirrored by equivalent upward mobility
ﬂows. Whether upward mobility is possible only depends on how much
policy must be the same regardless of the sector of occupation. This is a necessary feature
for this case of intermediate cost the property induced on the structure of the image set of
the mapping Φ allows, in principle, the extensions of the results in this section to more gen-
eral individualtransition functionsgenerated by a more general structure of the fundamental
economy (utility functional forms, bequest motive, endogenous wages).
8It is easy to see that the existence of a path connecting the red line with the green area
will imply the ergodicity of the system in this conﬁguration.
21wealth the unskilled manage to accumulate in the long run vis a vis the min-
imum investment cost. If wages in the unskilled sector are large enough,
x < b then upward wealth mobility ﬂows are able to balance the down-
ward wealth mobility (implied by necessary downward occupational mobil-
ity ﬂows) and the economy can sustain investment in the long run featuring
wealth and occupational mobility; if b ≤ x the only possible limit distribution
settles on b with full measure. In such a conﬁguration, it is not possible for
poverty traps to arise, even with indivisibilities and ﬁnancial market imper-
fections 9.
It is worth noticing that, the result holds regardless of how large the
support measuring genetic variation ∆x is. Even a small amount of hetero-
geneity induces ergodicity as long as there always exist the possibility of
investment being inefﬁcient in wealthy lineages. Relatedly, the result holds
regardless of whether ﬁnancial market imperfections constrain investment
choices in segments other than at the bottom of the wealth distribution. On
the other hand, even in the case of self sustaining growth with occupational
mobility ﬁnancial market do not necessarily disappear over the long run
because of wealth accumulation within lineages. In particular it holds the
following result:
Lemma 3. The offspring of an unskilled household is wealth constrained
(b ≤ ˜ x) at b if and only if the offspring of the less wealthy household in the
skilled sector (an agent receiving wealth in a neighborhood of bs) is wealth
constrained too.
This implies that, contrary to what happensin the case of homogeneous
costs (where, once a lineage’s wealth is above a threshold that allows in-
vestment than the lineage is not wealth constrained forever on), ﬁnancial
market imperfections can not necessarily disappear over the long run if lin-
eages in the traditional sector are constrained.
The model predicts that, at any given point in time along the dynamic
path and at steady state, the impact of ﬁnancial market imperfections at
the bottom of the wealth distribution is necessarily the same as in lineages
in intermediate segments of the wealth distribution employed in the skilled
sector: if a positive measure of agents is constrained in the unskilled sec-
tor so will be a (lower) positive measure of households in the skilled sector.
The immediate empirical implication is that whenever it is observed that
educational investment varies across wealth groups within household with
parents in the skilled sector, then ﬁnancial market imperfections must be
binding for both the lower and the middle class, even in the limit. Therefore,
if one lineage at a given point in time faces the consequences of ﬁnancial
9This result can easily be generalizedto the extent that the economy generatesan image
set under Φ with topological properties similar to those illustrated in ﬁgure 2. More precisely
it is easy to see that, the existence of e x ∈ ∆x is equivalent to the existence of a path in Φ
connecting the image of the bequest function in both occupational sectors.
22market imperfection it must be true that every lineage will face the conse-
quencesof ﬁnancial market imperfections10. This fact motivates our interest
in the exploration of redistributive policies.
2.2 The evolution of wealth distribution in the case of low ﬁxed
costs (˜ x > ∆x)
In the case of low ﬁxed costs educational investment is proﬁtable to every
agent in all lineages. There is no ﬁnite history of bad draws in the genetic
lottery within wealthy lineages that can trigger downward occupational mo-
bility and the associated downward wealth mobility. The role of ﬁnancial
market imperfections is clearly the only constraint faced by agents in their
investment choice. Since ﬁnancial market imperfections are all that mat-
ters in driving education investment choice and they are the only force that
shape wealth mobility, the role of genetic variation is less important (but not
null, of course). Therefore, initial wealth is crucial and we can expect that
non ergodicity emerges in the form of poverty traps.
The mapping for the evolution of wealth is reported in ﬁgure 5.11
10This property does not hinge on the assumption of constant return to factor and can
be generalized. This is provided in a separate paper. To get the intuition notice that with
decreasing returns to scale in both sectors the skill premium is monotonically decreasing.
Suppose that, at a given point in time, for w and v such that e x ∈ ∆x, Lemma 3 must hold.
Then in any subsequent period with w
′ < w and v
′ > v skilled agents are still constrained.
11By looking at Figure 5 notice that the (topological) properties of function Φ in the case
of low costs suggest that we should expect that the limit distribution will actually depend on
the initial distribution of wealth. Since there is no level of x such that the any agent in any
range of the wealth distribution is indifferent across occupations, for each b we have that
(1 − α)v + ρb < (1 − α)w + ρ(b − x) for all x ∈ ∆x, so that the red line describing the
bequest policy for agents in the unskilled sector has no contact point with the green area







Figure 5. Image set of b under Φ in the case of Low Investment Costs (Self
Sustaining Growth)
The evolution of wealth distribution is characterized in the following
Proposition 2. For ˜ x > ∆x the following results hold:
i) (Decline) if b ≤ x and bs < x then the system is ergodic and the
dynamics of the wealth distributions converge to b with full measure;
ii) (Self Sustaining Growth with Social Mobility) if x < b then the system
is ergodic and it converges to [b, b] with a unique measure  ∗. In
particular if x ≤ bs the system converges to [bs, b], in this case every
agent will be employed in the skilled sector over the long run;
iii) (Poverty Trap) if b ≤ x ≤ x < bs then the system is not ergodic and





measure that depends on  0.
Notice, again, that ergodicity- when obtained- holds with respect to  0.
Which limit distribution will prevail depends on the set of parameters Γ. No-
tice also that, provided the relevant conditions in Proposition 2 are satisﬁed,
the amount of genetic variation in the ability process G(x) does not matter.
Both case i) and case ii) in Proposition 2 also emerged in the regime of
intermediate ﬁxed costs. The reason for their emergence in the case cur-
rently under analysis is, however, completely different. In the case where
˜ x ∈ ∆x ergodicity was driven by the fact that each agent in all lineages
24and regardless of wealth distribution, could be hit by a sufﬁciently long
sequence of bad shocks in the process generating x (downward occupa-
tional mobility ﬂows were always in operation on efﬁciency grounds). In the
present context of small ﬁxed costs, instead, every agent in the economy
is efﬁcient and the main role in the shaping of the dynamics is played by
ﬁnancial market imperfections, which are the only mechanism regulating
whether upward occupational and wealth mobility channel are operative.
In particular, whereas in the case analyzed in the previous section the
properties of the long run distribution depend only the impact of ﬁnancial
market imperfections in the lower segments of the wealth distribution (at a
neighborhood of {b}) here things are different. What matters for the long
run now is how ﬁnancial constraints operate both at the low and at the
intermediate range of the wealth distribution i.e. how severely credit market
imperfections affect choices at {b} and {bs} at any time.
In case i) x ≥ b implies, as usual, that once a lineage gravitates in a
neighborhood of b the occupational destiny is doomed and there is no way
to escape that position in the wealth distribution; whereas bs < x implies
that the poorest among the skilled households can be wealth constrained
for a large enough value of x, i.e. the measure of credit constrained agents
holding bs is positive and these households have to disregard proﬁtable hu-
man capital investment opportunities. Again when ﬁnancial market imper-
fections affect the middle class (in the wealth scale), decline is the resulting
outcome.
The emergence of poverty traps (case iii)) is, instead, speciﬁc for the
conﬁguration of parameters under consideration. Again it arises from the
speciﬁc mode of operation of ﬁnancial market imperfections. With small
ﬁxed costs, ﬁnancial market imperfections affect differently the choices of
agents in the neighborhood {b} who cannot invest and agents in the neigh-
borhood of {bs} who will always invest since bs ≥ x, inducing polarization
effects on the wealth distribution in the long run (as in Gal-Or and Zeira,
1993). Notice that, whenever poverty traps emerge, ﬁnancial market imper-
fections for households in the intermediate range of the wealth distribution
are, as time goes by, overcome by family bequest driven by altruism and
disappear for a the fraction of population not in the trap.
Finally notice that even in this case ergodicity with self sustaining growth
it is not necessarily the case that ﬁnancial market imperfection are elimi-
nated over the long run. Part ii) of Proposition 2 speciﬁes that the elimi-
nation of the ﬁnancial market imperfections over the long run depends on
whether it holds bs > x, which only happens when the ﬁrst best level of in-
vestment is achieved, every agentendsup to be employed in the skilled sec-
tor. Once again, similarly to the previous section, whenever bs ≤ x both the
middle class and agents in the unskilled sector will be wealth constrained,
even in the long run: steady state with occupational mobility require that
25ﬁnancial market imperfection is not eliminated by wealth accumulation.
Taken together Propositions 1 and 2 have clear cut predictions linking
the observation of occupational mobility to the evolution of wealth distribu-
tion and the economic perspectives of the aggregate economy. One exam-
ple for all: if at any point in time the economy features no upward occupa-
tional mobility ﬂows and a positive (arbitrarily small) amount of downward
occupational mobility ﬂows, then the wealth accumulation process of the
economy is set on a declining path, therefore both future aggregate (and
per capita) income and wealth must be expected to decline. On the other
hand, if different investment frequencies are observed in different wealth
groups (even in the subset of skilled households) then ﬁnancial market im-
perfection do not disappear over the long run, and each lineage is doomed
to face wealth constraints in her history. This motivates our exploration in
the next section.
3 Implications for redistributive policies
It is well known that local indivisibilities and the failure of ﬁnancial mar-
kets form an economic environment where the initial distribution can mat-
ter. Equivalently, temporary (both structural and policy) shocks can have
permanent effect in this environment. If ﬁnancial market failure cannot be
corrected redistributive policies can have permanent effects on investment,
equality of opportunity and per capita income. An example of the effec-
tiveness of policies arises in the case of homogeneous agents: if average
wealth in the economy (or the scale of outside intervention through exter-
nal resources) is large enough ”one shot redistribution policies can have
permanent effects”, both for the elimination of the poverty trap and for the
role of policy response to transitory adverse shocks. This view about the
role of transitory policies in environments exhibiting poverty traps has been
challenged in models where long run intervention is required by the emer-
gence of so called mobility traps (Piketty, 1997, 2000, Aghion and Bolton,
1997), similar conclusions are suggested by Mookherjee and Napel (2007)
in a model with heterogeneity and endogenousfactor prices12. With this de-
bate in mind, in this section, we investigate the following question: what are
the implications of heterogeneity for the design of effective policies aimed
at increasing educational investment, per capita output and social mobility
in a standard environment with indivisibilities?
We will argue that heterogeneity introduces additional constraints on
policy design, calling for longer time span of intervention. In some cases
12The role of large scale temporary policies has been important for the policy debate
in developing countries where any form of initial accumulation of asset is prevented by
fundamentalconditionsfor a large fraction of the population(see for example, Sachs, 2005).
26persistent policies are required as in models of mobility traps. On the other
hand we show that heterogeneity in abilities makes redistributive policies
somewhat more powerful: they not only can dismantle poverty traps when
they arise (as in the case of homogeneous agents), but there exist con-
ditions under which policies are effective in scenarios of decline (induced
by ﬁnancial market imperfections) where they would be ineffective under
homogeneity.13
Both points are quite intuitive in principle: heterogeneity in abilities in-
troduces additional constraints on redistributive policies that are essentially
informational in nature.
Whenever ability is not observed there are two additional problems: on
the one hand low wealth does not necessarily imply that the agent is ef-
ﬁcient and therefore investment should be ﬁnanced; on the other hand a
tax on agents in high segments of the wealth distribution is limited since, in
order not to exploit wealth preventing efﬁcient investment by wealth house-
holds agents should not be taxed so that net wealth is below their invest-
ment costs. In the absence of observability, would have incentive to report
high ability cost. Therefore, if there is no way to guaranteeincentive compat-
ibility properly, a tax transfer scheme is limited upward by b−T ≥ min{e x,x}
to guarantee efﬁcient investment, therefore a tax transfer scheme cannot
raise the same revenues as in the case of homogeneousagents, for a given
wealth distribution.
It is also intuitive that heterogeneity in ability among lineages (which
is transitory, since by assumption the process for genetic variation is i.i.d.)
generates heterogeneity in wealth (which is more persistent since it can get
transmitted14) introducing more scope for redistribution. With perfect ﬁnan-
cial markets, the transitory mismatch between ability (a technology in the
educational investment process) and the distribution of wealth (as a source
of ﬁnance) would be cleared intertemporally by debt/credit positions across
lineages15. These same forces that would make the credit market thicker
13Our discussion will not deal with shocks. However it is clear that whether ergodicity is
present or not hinges on the possibility that transitory shocks have permanent effects. The
same argument provided to establish effectiveness of policy interventions can be used to
characterize the effectiveness of policies to counteract the permanent effects of temporary
shocks. An instance of such policies can be easily constructed in the context of the present
model: consider the case (as it happens for a poverty trap scenario) of temporary exoge-
nous shocks driving wealth down to the level where investment is no longer feasible, our
results imply that there exist conditions under which temporary redistributive policies avoid
the decline.
14Even if ”ability” would be partially endogenous so that wealth family can reduce x by
suitable investment as in Becker and Tomes (1979) the same point would hold as long
as wealth can be transmitted at a lower cost than ability. This would be true whenever
ability, although partially transmittable, includes some i.i.d. component. In other words the
presence of i.i.d. componentsin a model with endogenoustalent only relocatesthe problem
of ﬁnancial market imperfections on layer up in the education process.
15A temporarily inefﬁcient wealthy lineage would ﬁnance investment in a temporarily efﬁ-
27due to heterogeneity, we argue, increase the scope for (redistributive) policy
intervention in the absence of credit markets16.
More speciﬁcally we will show, ﬁrstly, that, compared to homogeneous
costs, in the presence of heterogeneity, the required horizon for effective re-
distributive policies must be, in a well deﬁned sense, longer. This is impor-
tant since, when policies are transitory, considerations about the bequest
motive and associated distortions (e.g. crowding out effects on private sav-
ings) due to redistribution are less important, in the light of the transitory
nature of the intervention. If heterogeneity is an important aspect, then the
required time horizon for effective redistribution policies is longer, anticipa-
tion of tax and associated distortions in bequest are relevant and therefore
the preservation of the tax base in the future can be an important concern
even in models with indivisibilities.17
Secondly we will show that, with heterogeneity, there is a larger scope
for policies than in the homogenous cost case: in a well deﬁned sense
genetic variation can be exploited for the design of effective redistributive
policies in cases where policy is ineffective under homogeneity. 18
Before providing the details a few remarks are in order to clarify the
limits of our analysis. Firstly, we stick to our modeling choice where the be-
quest motive is given by ”joy of giving” motive 19 disregarding the crowding
out effect of redistribution on savings.
Secondly, our focus is on feasibility constraints (i.e. policies are required
to be budget balanced period by period), no optimality criterion is cast on
the class of tax transfer policies considered here. We will simply deﬁne a
policy as ”effective” to the extent that it is able to support a larger measure
of investment (and output) than otherwise.
Finally, as already noticed, in the presence of heterogeneity, the tax
transfer scheme is, in principle, informationally more demanding because
cient poor lineage to the point where the rate of return to educational investment is larger
than the ﬁnancial investment. With enough wealth in the economy every x ≥ e x would be
ﬁnanced.
16As long as tax distortions do not destroy incentive to transmit wealth. See below.
17It is clear that the requirement of proper scale in policies aimed at dismantling the
poverty trap is related to the same point. If the scale of intervention cannot dismantle the
trap in one period, the are of course other ways to eliminate poverty traps in the presence of
non convexities (decentralized as Roscas, or different forms of public intervention designed
in the form of ”triage”) where the required scale of redistribution can be reduced at the cost
of prolonging the time horizon of the policy with similar consequence on the relevance of
distortionary effects.
18One implication being that, policies can prevent the long run effects of temporary ad-
verse shocks. As it is well known one important aspect of redistributive policies in models
where poverty traps can arise is the possibility for transitory policies to have permanent ef-
fects. An important related question is what is the scope for policy in the case of an adverse
transitory shock hitting the economy (see Gal-Or and Zeira, 1993).
19See e.g. Aghion and Bolton (1997) for a motivation of policy analysis under similar
assumptions; see also Cremer and Pestieau (2003) for a survey.
28of two relevant dimensions, wealth and ability. Both aspects are potentially
important in the design of the redistributive scheme. In the following analy-
sis we will assume that wealth is observable, whereas ability is not; i.e. we
construct redistributive policies conditioned on wealth, but not on the ability
of the agent and will always make sure that investment by high cost agents
is, if efﬁcient, never prevented by taxation20.
3.1 Some implications for policy in the case of homogeneous
costs
We preliminarily review some implications for redistributive policies in the
model with homogeneous costs. Again, as in section 2, some or all of
these results are well known and discussed sparsely in many of the con-
tributions already mentioned. A brief review is useful as a benchmark for
the subsequent assessment of the implications of heterogeneity for policy
design.
We start by constructing a simple example and consider a policy tack-
ling the poverty trap. We assume that the initial wealth is large enough to
obtain feasibility of a large enough one shot intervention.
Deﬁnition 2. Let e  0 be the initial distribution of wealth such that
R ∞
0 bde  0 =
xe.
The economy is rich in wealth just enough to allow a one shot transfers
so that all lineages overcome the wealth threshold that, in the absence of
credit markets, makes investment viable,
Deﬁnition 3. Let T = {σ,τ} be a tax transfer scheme such that b − τ ≥ xe
(i.e. T preserves investment by taxed agents);
The above deﬁnition restrict the class of transfer schemes within which
the analysis is provided.
Deﬁnition 4. Let n∗(e  0) the minimum number of periods such that the
transfer system T is in place and  n∗+1(xe) = 0,
It deﬁnes the minimum number of periods after which every agent in the
economy faces no wealth constraints and can therefore invest, if efﬁcient.
The following proposition summarizes conditions under which transitory
policy has permanent effect in the case of no heterogeneity.
20This will insure that incentive compatibility constraints are always satisﬁed in a weak
sense (i.e. in any direct mechanism on x, under the proposed tax scheme, the agent is
indifferent between truthtelling and misreporting x).
We concentrate on redistribution of wealth across lineages.This is equivalent to the case
where tax revenues are used as a source of ﬁnance for public investment that reduce indi-
visibilities (transportation infrastructure or location of schools in remote villages).
29Lemma 4. Fix e  0 as in Deﬁnition 2 and n∗(e  0) as in Deﬁnition 4, then there
exist a transfer system T satisfying Deﬁnition 3 such that the following holds
true:
i) if xe < bs (poverty trap and self sustaining growth) then n∗(e  0) = 1;
ii) if xe > bs (decline) then there exist no T which is feasible after a ﬁnite
nd(e  0) and such that 1 −  nd+1(b) > 0 for b > xe.
In words i) states the well known results that there exist a family of
initial distributions (all those that stochastically dominate e  0(b)) of wealth
such that, for any initial distribution belonging to this family, a one shot
redistributive policy dismantles the poverty trap.
Result ii) states that the action of the policy maker, under homogeneous
costs, is much more limited when the economy is declining. In this case
there is no feasible redistributive policy T that can prevent the decline. The
intuition is easy: in a collapsing economy the fundamentals are such that
family altruism is not large enough in each lineage to accumulate enough
wealth to sustain investment in the long run. There is no way for policy to
shut off the leakage driving wealth de-cumulation in order to prevent down-
ward occupational mobility in middle class households. Redistributing re-
sources from the upper segments of the wealth distribution to middle class
is not feasible since the dynamics of the economy destroy, sooner or later,
the tax base. This result will be different when heterogeneity comes into
play.
Of course the scope for policy in the economic environment under anal-
ysis is larger than the simple scheme analyzed: when the economy oper-
ates in a regime with a poverty trap and wealth distribution is stochastically
dominated by e  0 it is still possible to limit the measure of recipients of the
program to a subset of the poor. If distortionary effects of taxation are small
enough this policy will eliminate the poverty trap in the long run.21 A tran-
sitory transfer policy is feasible in a standard poverty trap environment with
homogenous agents, in other words it is always feasible to empty the pool
of ﬁnancially constrained agents if xe < bs even with a ”small” safety net
operating for a sufﬁciently long horizon.
Remember that results on non-ergodicity in models with indivisibilities
and ﬁnancial market imperfections can be immediately be re-interpreted in
terms of resiliency of the economy to transitory shocks. It is easy to show
that if the economy satisﬁes conditions for self sustaining growth (case i)
then there is no shock that can destroy conditions for ergodicity: after the
21As in triage policies. Compared to a lottery where recipients are randomly chosen (as
in Roscas), by targeting suitable segments of the wealth distribution (triage) it is possible to
minimize the tax requirements to achieve this target.
30shock disappears the economy returns to its converging dynamics. Ergodic-
ity is equivalent to resiliency of the economy to prolonged (albeit transitory)
shocks and redistributive policies have no long run effects. (This can be
considered just an equivalent deﬁnition for ergodicity). If, on the other hand,
the economy operates in a regime of poverty trap then there always exist
a large enough temporary shock such that the measure of skilled agents
is reduced to zero and there exist no way to design redistribution, from
households in the upper segments of the wealth distribution to households
in the intermediate segments, that prevent downward occupational mobility
and the ensuing downward wealth mobility, destroying the ﬁnancial basis of
future investment in all lineages. 22
To summarize, provided that the economy is rich enough, a poverty
trap can always be dismantled by a one time intervention, whereas decline
cannot be arrested. These conclusions will be different in the presence of
heterogeneity as we show next.
3.2 Some implications for policy in the presence heterogeneity
Remember that one of the consequences of the introduction of heterogene-
ity in previous sections was that a sufﬁcient condition for ergodicity to hold is
the presence of inefﬁcient agents in the population (as in the case denoted
intermediate ﬁxed costs). On the other hand, we showed that whenever
wages in the unskilled occupation are close enough to subsistence, and
educational investment is efﬁcient for all agents in the economy, a poverty
trap arises (as in the case denotedintermediate costs). In both cases, ﬁnan-
cial market imperfections survive at steady state with occupational mobility,
motivating this analysis.
We will show that heterogeneity of investment costs has two implica-
tions on policy design: 1. it requires more persistent policies in order for
redistribution to be effective and 2. it enlarges the scope for policy effective-
ness, in declining economies.
In order to study the implications of heterogeneity for the time horizon
required by redistributive policies to be effective we consider a comparison
performed under the same structural parameters and initial wealth distribu-
tion as in the homogeneous cost case, i.e. e  0(b) satisfy Deﬁnition 2. The
equivalent deﬁnition for the minimum number of periods after which policy
can be dismantled in the case of heterogeneity is the following
Deﬁnition 5. Let n∗(e  0) the minimum number of periods such that the
transfer system T is in place and  n∗+1(x) = 0.
It holds:
22It is immediate to notice that if the economy operating in the regime of decline is hit by
an adverse shock the convergence to b is accelerated, and, a fortiori, there cannot exist an
effective policy.
31Proposition 3. Suppose x is observable by the policy-maker. Fix e  0 as in
Deﬁnition 2, T as in Deﬁnition 3 and n∗(e  0) as in Deﬁnition 5. If x ≤ bs and
x > b (poverty trap), then n∗(e  0) = 1
From the above proposition it is clear that with no additional informa-
tionalconstraint induced by heterogeneity,policy effectiveness can be achieved
under the same conditions as in the case of homogeneous costs.
Deﬁnition 6. Let T = {σ,τ} be a tax transfer scheme such that b − τ ≥
min{x, e x}, and σ − b ≤min{x,e x}
The above deﬁnition restricts the class of transfer schemes within which
the analysis is provided, Notice that T preserves (efﬁcient) investment by
taxed agents if efﬁcient and does not provide subsidies above the (efﬁcient)
investment cost. The following result holds:
Proposition 4. Suppose x is not observable. Fix e  0 as in Deﬁnition 2, T
as in Deﬁnition 6 and n∗(e  0) as in Deﬁnition 5. If x ≤ bs and x > b (poverty
trap), then for any G(x) satisfying Assumption 2 it must be n∗( 0) > 1.
In words, under the same aggregate conditions under which a one shot
intervention has permanent effects under homogeneouscosts, heterogene-
ity does require more persistent intervention to dismantle the poverty trap,
unless investment transfer and tax can be conditioned upon both b and x.
The intuitive reason for this result is that when x is not observable, in or-
der to preserve incentives to invest to wealthy people the planner cannot
tax wealth below x. On the same ground, in order to allow investment in
lineages with low wealth the minimum amount of wealth to be transferred
is, again, x. I.e. heterogeneity makes feasibility constraints more binding
for the policymaker. The lack of information by the policy maker makes re-
distributive policies more persistent than in the absence of heterogeneity in
order to achieve similar results (all efﬁcient agents manage to invest).23
A less immediate result holds for the case in which the economy is on a
declining path:
Proposition 5. Suppose x is not observable by the policymaker. Fix e  0 as
in Deﬁnition 2, T as in Deﬁnition 6 and n∗(e  0) as in Deﬁnition 5. If bs < x
and x > b (decline). Then for any G(x) satisfying Assumption 2 it holds:
i) (Low investment costs) If
bs ≥ (1 − ρ)x + ρxe
then T permanently in place is such that e = 1 for a strictly positive
measure of agents in each period and therefore  t(b) < 1
23Althoughthe exact implicationsof incentivecompatibilityis left for futurework we conjec-
ture that the effect of explicitly considering incentive compatibility constraints in the design
of the transfer policy will increase the persistence of the policy required to be effective.
32ii) (Intermediate investment costs) If
bs ≥ (1 − ρ   G(˜ x)) ˜ x + ρ   G(˜ x)   E[G | x ≤ ˜ x]
then T permanently in place such that e = 1 for a strictly positive
measure of agents in each period and therefore  t(b) < 1.
In other words the proposition above states that in a scenario of decline
policy is effective as long as the minimum wealth inherited by the offspring
of a household in the skilled sector is large enough.
Therefore, contrary to the case of homogeneity, it is possible to use re-
distributive policies (from higher segments of the wealth distribution to lower
segments)24 that allow the economy to sustain investment for a subset of
agents provided some conditions on Γ hold. The intuition is the following:
suppose that, given the initial distribution of wealth, it is feasible for the
policymaker to tax households in the top segments of wealth distribution
(there exist a positive measure of b > x) and ﬁnance investment in lower
segments. If the condition (1 − ρ)x + ρxe ≤ bs holds25, then this policy
can be replicated for an arbitrarily large number of periods to avoid decline.
The condition under which the policy can be replicated require that the in-
vestment cost is low enough for a sufﬁciently large measure of agents, or
the minimum level of wealth accumulated by agents in the skilled sector is
large enough (so that the scale of intervention satisﬁes the ﬁscal budget
constraint). Under such condition T supports the same measure of invest-
ment next period and so on.
We conclude therefore that, in the presence of heterogeneity- even if x
is not observable- decline can be prevented by a system of transfer policies.
The same transfer system would fail for the same aggregate economy in the
absence of heterogeneity.
One immediate but important implication of the Proposition 5 is that
redistributive policies in the environment considered can be extremely pow-
erful in avoiding long term persistence of temporary shocks: consider an
economy working under in the steady state conﬁguration considered in
Proposition 2 point iii) (i.e. poverty trap); consider, for example, the effect of
a (perfectly forecasted) temporary negative shock on wealth: this will have
the effect of permanently reducing the investment level in the economyeven
(when hitting for a sufﬁciently long time horizon) forcing investment to zero.
A redistributive policy (albeit temporary) of the kind devised in Proposition
24As noticed in the case homogeneous costs, reverse redistribution can also sustain in-
vestment in a scenario of decline, by transferring resources from households in the un-
skilled occupations to households in skilled occupations, whose wealth, in the dynamics, is
doomed to fall below x in ﬁnite time.
25Trivial algebra shows that the condition (1 − ρ)x + ρxe ≤ bs is consistent with bs < x
since 0 < ρ < 1.
335 would allow the economy to avoid such effect by preserving investment
opportunities for the same measure of agents as before the negative shock.
In such a scenario a temporary policy is able to design a safety net for a
subset of household avoiding the decline.
Finally, it also holds:
Corollary 1. If the sufﬁcient conditions in Proposition 5 hold with strictly in-
equality, then a permanent policy makes it feasible for all lineages to invest
in the long run, whenever it is efﬁcient.
Summarizing, we have shown that heterogeneity has two important im-
plications for the design of feasible redistributive policies in the presence of
indivisibilities. Since they require more information to target tax and sub-
sidies to wealth segments of the population than the homogeneous case,
redistributive policies are subject to additional constraints that induce larger
policy persistence in order to remove wealth constraints to investment. At
the same time, policies can be more effective in the presence of hetero-
geneity. To show this we constructed an example where under similar fun-
damental conditions under which a one shot intervention has permanent
effect in the homogeneous cost case, a more prolonged time span for pol-
icy is required in the presence of heterogeneity. Another example showed
that in conditions of decline where redistributive policies are completely in-
effective in the hypothesis of homogeneouscosts, the policymaker, through
suitable transfers, can exploit genetic variation to dynamically reconstruct
the tax base and preventing the economy from decline. Equivalently, under
heterogeneity redistribution increases the resiliency of the economy to tran-
sitory (albeit prolonged) shocks that would otherwise set the economy on a
path of decline.
4 Extensions
Most of our results in section 3 can be extended to less restrictive hypothe-
sis on the main structure of the model.
Considering a different bequest motive would not change the results on
the dynamic equilibrium of the model (see Piketty, 2000) provided that the
main qualitative features of the bequest function Φ deﬁning the evolution of
wealth within lineageswould be preserved underquite generalassumptions
26.
26More precisely, the main results of section 3 would be maintained to the extent the fun-
damentalsare such that the topologicalpropertiesof the inverse image set of the Φ function
are maintained. The presence of a discontinuity in the bequest function is maintained since
it is induced by the presence of ﬁxed cost and the absence of ﬁnancial market requiring
34We assumed that individual characteristics only matter in the skilled sec-
tor on the presumption that the unskilled sector represents the traditional
sector where productive capabilities can be transferred within families and
the standard technology does not require individual talents and ﬁnancial
investment to be learned and applied to production. In a more general
interpretation (market luck), individual characteristics can be a feature of
individual performance in both sectors. In such a model the result on the
ergodicity in Proposition 1 would not be changed (if any, ergodicity would
obtained a fortiori). Results in Proposition 2 still hold with suitable qualiﬁca-
tions. In particular poverty traps obtain to the extent that market luck in the
unskilled sector would not be large enough to overcome ﬁnancial market
imperfections in the households there employed27.
In the course of the paper we considered an i.i.d. process for the trans-
mission of abilities within lineages, a positive correlation of genetic endow-
ment (to include, for example, the effect of nurturing, as in Becker and
Tomes, 1979) would increase persistence of wealth distribution without af-
fecting the main results.
Finally, the analysis of the model with endogenous returns to factor
could be easily extended as in Gal-Or and Zeira ([9] 1993), where agents
are homogeneous with respect to the investment costs. With endogenous
labor productivity, in particular it is easy to see that a continuum of steady
state (limit distributions) would arise whenever the initial condition factor
allocation is such that the induced factor prices are consistent with the con-
ditions for the poverty trap characterized in section 2 and 3. For example in
the case where the initial allocation is concentrated in the traditional sector
and the skill premium w − v is large, the economy is likely to exhibit non
ergodicity as in the case of low ﬁxed costs analyzed above. If the initial dis-
tribution allows some upward occupational mobility wealthy agents in the
traditional sector, on the other hand, ergodicity is more likely to emerge
along the lines and under the conditions studied in Mookherjee and Napel
([12] 2007), where heterogeneity is present but there is no wealth accumu-
lation within lineages.
As for the implications of heterogeneity on policy design, the argument
for extension is more delicate, as already argued in section 4. Indeed the
more prolonged time horizon required in order for policies to be effective
can induce a deadweight losses due to expected taxation under alternative
assumptions on the bequest motive. Such modiﬁcations would generate a
model where the trade off between efﬁciency and redistribution is relevant
a threshold level of wealth beyond which ﬁnancial market imperfections become irrelevant.
The location of this discontinuity with respect to the boundary of the support of the ﬁxed
cost would dictate the properties of the model in terms of ergodicity. See Bernheim and
Ray (1987) for the monotonicity almost everywhere of the bequest strategy in the case of
dynastic preferences.
27Here the discussion in Gal Or and Zeira (1993) p.43 applies along similar lines.
35for policy design. Notice however, that the presence of distortionary effects
would restrict the tax base and make the feasibility constraint even tighter,
increasing the time required time horizon compared to the one shot redis-
tribution in the homogenous cost case. The results on the larger scope
allowed by heterogeneity would also be inﬂuenced restricting the sufﬁcient
conditions in Propositions (4) and (5).
5 Conclusions
We studied the implications of individual heterogeneity for the evolution of
wealth distribution in a standard model with ﬁnancial market imperfections
and local non convexities in education investment technology. We consid-
ered heterogeneity in the cost of education investment, interpreted as ge-
netic variation at the level of lineage.
Ergodicity obtains whenever the distribution of education costs entails
the presence of ability types for which the educational investment is inefﬁ-
cient vis a vis ﬁnancial investment, regardless of how ”large” the support of
the distribution of abilities is. Conversely, a poverty trap can emerge only if
investment is efﬁcient for every single agent in the economy.
Does ergodicity of the wealth distribution imply the ability of lineages to
overcome ﬁnancial market imperfections in the long run? The answer is a
qualiﬁed no. If the distribution of education costs includes both efﬁcient and
inefﬁcient types, the implication is that ﬁnancial market imperfection can
disappear. However, it is established that whenever households in the tradi-
tional sectors are wealth constrained so are agents in the skilled sector with
low wealth (middle class), in every long run equilibrium with occupational
mobility. In this latter case, due to ergodicity, every lineage will face wealth
constraint in any history and in the steady state.
If the distribution of education costs is such that educational investment
is efﬁcient for every agent in the economy, ﬁnancial market imperfection
cannot disappear in the long run. In the case of poverty traps (no occupa-
tional mobility) ﬁnancial market imperfection will not disappear by deﬁnition,
for the subset of trapped lineages, as in the case of homogeneous costs. In
the case of ergodic distribution ﬁnancial market imperfections cannot disap-
pear whenever the steady state entails occupational mobility. Once again,
every lineage will meet wealth constraint in any history and in the steady
state.
The persistence of ﬁnancial market imperfection in cases when ergod-
icity is induced by heterogeneity and a more general interest about the role
of the latter in policy design motivated our exploration of policy issues.
In particular we show that, in a well deﬁned sense, models with hetero-
geneity call for more persistent policies. We also show that redistributive
policies can be more effective in environments with heterogeneous agents,
36specially when transitory shocks may set the economy on a declining path,
as well as in economies featuring poverty traps. The results suggest that
indeed temporary policies are less effective in altering educational invest-
ment, per capita income and inequality in the presence of heterogeneity. If
the failure of ﬁnancial markets in the process of education investment and
its persistence in the development path is an important feature and ﬁnanc-
ing has to rely on a system of public transfer then, heterogeneity, per se,
deﬁnes conditions for policies that call for the establishment of long run
institutions for their design.
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39Appendix A.
Here we introduce notation, a list of deﬁnitions used in the paper and in the
remaining of the Appendix and we report a few preliminary results on the
Markov process for the evolution of wealth distribution.
Let b be a real number and S an element of the system of Borel sets on Z,
a bounded set of R+.
Deﬁnition 7. A transition probability on Z is a function Q : Z × Z →
[0,1] such that 1. Q(b,.) is a probability measure and 2. Q(.,S) is a
Z−measurable function on R+. Where Z is the collection of Borel sets
on Z.
Φ deﬁnes a transition probability in our model. For any b ∈ Z and S ∈ Z,





where Φ−1(S; b) := {x ∈ [x,x] | Φ(b; x) ∈ S}.
Using 14 it is immediate to prove that Q satisﬁes Deﬁnition 7.
The deﬁnition of the above transition probability allows us to deﬁne the
object of our analysis, the evolution of wealth distribution, in the standard
way (see Stokey and Lucas, 1989) as stated in the next two deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 8. An equilibrium distribution of bequest at time t is a probability
measure satisfying  t = T∗ t−1; where T∗ t−1 =
R
Z Q(b,S)(d t−1), i.e. T∗
is the self adjoint operator on Q.
Deﬁnition 9. A steady state (invariant) distribution of bequest is a measure
  satisfying  ∗ = T∗ ∗.
Limit Support
Proof of Lemma 1 (homogeneous costs).
Part i) If xe > bs, then there exists no ﬁxed point for φs(b; xe) < b. Indeed if
b > b then we have that φs(b; xe) < b.
Part ii) If xe < b, then there exists no ﬁxed point for φu and the credit
market imperfection vanishes in the long run, indeed bs ≤ b.
Part iii) If b ≤ xe ≤ bs, then there exist a unique ﬁxed point for φs, i.e.
((1 − α)w − ρxe)(1 − ρ)−1 and a unique ﬁxed point for φu. This means that
FP is disconnected. More precisely FP = {b,((1 − α)w − ρxe)(1 − ρ)−1}.
￿
40Proof of Lemma 2. (heterogeneous costs). First of all notice that
wealth bequeathed by the poorest unskilled is always below the wealth be-
queathed by the richest investing agent deﬁned as the agents with lowest
costs x and wealth bmax in the initial set S0 = [bmin,bmax], therefore it holds
Φ(bmin; x) ≤ Φ(b; x) ≤ Φ(bmax; x)
equivalently S1 = [Φ(bmin; x), Φ(bmax; x)].
By induction, set Sn = [Φn(bmin; x)Φn(bmax; x)] where:
Φn(bmin; x) = Φ(Φn−1(bmin; x); x)
Φn(bmax; x) = Φ(Φn−1(bmax; x); x)
by trivial algebra and using the deﬁnition of Φ we get













((1 − α)w − ρx)





An important result for the characterization for the evolution of measure  
is the following
Remark 2. b < bs if and only if bs < ˜ x. Indeed b =
(1−α)w−ρ˜ x
1−ρ = b and
bs = (1 − α)w, then
(1 − α)w − ρ˜ x
1 − ρ
< (1 − α)w ⇔ ˜ x > (1 − α)w.
In the following section we prove the result of dynamic of the wealth dis-
tribution.
Limit Distribution
Proof of Proposition 1.
Part i) The set of possible histories of any lineage can be partitioned in two
possible subsets, Hn such that a member of the lineage did not invested
ever and Hs such that at least a member of the lineage invested. Histories
in Hn will, in ﬁnite time, converge to a neighborhood of b since b ≤ x,
therefore upward occupational mobility is zero for such lineages.
Consider now lineages in Hs. They face a positive probability to disinvest,
since ˜ x ∈ ∆x, generating downward occupational mobility with positive
41measure. Therefore for any initial wealth, b, there exists Nb such that after
n > Nb generations with low ability offspring the lineage will end up with
wealth below x.
Part ii) Following Stokey and Lucas (1989) if Condition M holds then T∗
is a contraction, and if T∗ is a contraction then the Markov process is er-
godic.
We will show that Condition M holds in our model, i.e. there exists ǫ > 0
and an integer N ≥ 1 such that for any S ∈ B either QN(b,S) ≥ ǫ, all b ∈ B,
or QN(b,Sc) ≥ ǫ, all b ∈ B.
We proceed in two steps:
Step 1: We prove that if x < b, then limN→∞ ΦN(b) = S∞, all b ∈ B.
For any b ∈ B we put: Φ(b) = {Φ(b; x) | x ∈ ∆x} and ΦN(b) =
∪b′N−1(b)Φ(b′), for N > 1.
QN(b,S) is the probability that a lineage starting from b, after N generations
arrives to a wealth level in S ∩ ΦN(b).
In words, since x < b there is upward mobility, a household can reach b.
On the other hand, there always exist a sequence of arbitrary lenght such
that a lineage experiencing x > e x has positive measure, due to e x ∈ ∆x in-
ducing downward occupational mobility which, in turn, makes wealth state
b reachable starting from any initial wealth in B
Step 2: Suppose that Condition M is not satisﬁed, then there must exist
a borell set S ∩ S∞  = ∅, such that for any N we have:
bN ∈ B : ΦN(bN) ∩ S = ∅
Using Step 1, for all bN we have that limn→∞ Φn(bN) = S∞, then the
sequence {ΦN(bN)}N converges to S∞. We arrive to a contradiction
∅ = lim
N→∞
(S ∩ ΦN(bN)) = S ∩ lim
N→∞
ΦN(bN) = S ∩ S∞  = ∅.
Therefore Condition M holds in our model for the case of intermediate in-
vestment costs. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3.
Suppose b < ˜ x, then the inequality bs ≥ ˜ x yields a contradiction by Remark
2.
Suppose b > ˜ x, then the inequality bs ≤ ˜ x yields a contradiction by Remark
2. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2.
Part i) If b < x and bs < x then the equilibrium wealth is b, with full measure.
42The proof is the same as for point i) of Proposition 1.
Part ii) If x < b and bs < x then Condition M holds. The proof is the
same as for point ii) in Proposition 1.
Moreover if x < bs the offspring in skilled households will always invest,
∀x ∈ ∆x, i.e. there is no downward occupational mobility . Since x < b
every lineage will be able to invest, so that b > bs for every agent in the
economy.
Part iii) If b ≤ x and x < bs then the limit distribution depends on the
initial distribution  0. This is easy to show by considering two extreme
cases. Consider  0 that has full measure on [b,x], in this case no lineage
can switch to skilled occupations and every lineage converges to b.
On the other extreme consider  0 concentrated on [bs,b], any agent can
cover investment cost and there exists no downward occupational mobility
ﬂows. The equilibrium distribution has support in [bs,b]. ￿
43Appendix B: Proofs of results in Section 3
Proof of Lemma 4.
Part i) (Poverty Trap) Since  0 just satisﬁes feasibility for T, a one shot redis-
tribution such that bj = xe for any lineage j is feasible, e = 1 for all agents
in the economy. Moreover, since xe < φ(xe; xe) = bs, each agent will leave
a bequest larger than x, investment is feasible in all lineages thereafter;
therefore n∗( 0) = 1.
Part ii) (Decline) Since x = E[b | e  0], a one shot redistribution takes
every agent at bj = x. However it holds φ(xe; xe) < xe. Therefore aver-
age wealth next period must be lower than xe, implying that all agents will
disinvest.
The result can be trivially extended to a more general case E[b | e  0] >
xe, when, a fortiori, there exists a redistributive policy under which invest-
ment is feasible for all agents in the economy. To see this denote  ′
0 the
distribution of wealth induced by the redistributive scheme, i.e. E[b | e  0] =
E[b | e  ′
0].
Observe that φ(b; xe) < b, so  ′
0 stochastically dominates(ﬁrst orderstochas-
tic dominance) by  1. Then the average wealth in the economy decreases,
i.e. E[b | e  0] > E[b | e  1].
If xe > E[b | e  1] then feasibility is violated; If xe < E[b | e  1] redistribution is
feasible for the next period but the above argument can be replicated. By
induction there must exist N such that E[b | e  n] < xe, for n > N. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3 (poverty trap).
Suppose x is observable, then it is feasible for the policymaker to set T =
{σ,τ} such that:
ifb ≥ x τ(b, x) = b − x; ifb < x σ(b, x) = x − b
since E[b | e  0] = xe. Moreover ex hypothesis bs > x then investment is
self-sustaining in all lineages, i.e. n∗( 0) = 1, policy can be removed in one
period. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4 (poverty trap).
Suppose x is not observable. Fix e  0 such that xe = E[b | e  0]. ∀e  0, there
always exist ǫ > 0 such that ∆x = [xe −ǫ,xe +ǫ] and
R ∞
xe+ǫ d˜  0 > 0. Then it
is possible for the policymaker to set T = {σ,τ} such that:
ifb ≥ x τ(b) = b − x; ifb < x σ(b) = x − b.
Since 1 −  0(x) > 0 then there exists y < x such that it is feasible for
the policymaker for a measure of lineage given by
R y
0 d 0 > 0. Since y < x,
then it is immediate to conclude that n∗( 0) > 1.
44Notice that Φ(x; x) ≥ bs > x, imply there are no downward mobility
thereafter. The transfer scheme can be replicated to make the measure of
investing lineages increasing over time reaching 1 in ﬁnite time. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5 (decline).
Remember that decline can occur both in the case of low and intermedi-
ate investment costs. We prove the result for the case of low costs and
intermediate costs separately. For both conﬁgurations we construct redis-
tributive schemes such that permanent intervention prevents the economy
to decline, i.e. the measure of non investing agent induced by the policy
is  n(b) < 1. Suppose x is not observable, whereas individual wealth is
observable. Fix e  0 such that xe = E[b | e  0]. ∀e  0, there exists ǫ > 0 such
that ∆x = [xe − ǫ,xe + ǫ] and
R ∞
xe+ǫ de  0 > 0.
Without loss of generality deﬁne M1 the measure of investing agents
after redistribution. Then M1 =
R ∞
xe+ǫ de  0 +
R y
0 de  0.
Low cost of investment (˜ x > ∆x). Consider the following redistributive
scheme T = {σ,τ} such that:
ifb ≥ x τ(b) = b − x; ifb < x σ(b) = x − b
Deﬁne:
yx :=
bs − (1 − ρ)x
ρ
under parameter conﬁgurations such that the economy is in decline it holds:
bs ∈ ∆x, therefore simple algebra shows (use the deﬁnition of Φ) that there
exists yx ∈ ∆x. Such that:
Φ(x; x) =
￿
> x x < yx
< x x > yx
(15)
Which implies that the distribution of investment costs is such that there ex-
ists a positive measure of lineages who bequeth a larger amount of wealth
than the (net of taxation) they received. This implies that it is feasible for the
policymaker to replicate the tax scheme and to sustain a positive measure
of investment thereafter.
The measure of investing agents will be given by M1  G(yx). Therefore the
tax revenues from the next generation will be given by
E(M1) := M1   G(yx)   E[Φ(x; x) − x | x ≤ yx]
where G(yx) measures the probability that an agent features investment
cost below yx, E[Φ(x; x) − x | x ≤ yx] is the (conditional) average tax.
Subsidies for the subset of M1 who did not invest, whose measure is given
by M1(1 − G(yx)) will be deﬁned by the following
U(M1) := M1   (1 − G(yx))   E[x − Φ(x; x) | x > yx]
45where E[x − Φ(x; x) | x > yx] is the conditional average subsidy.
The transfer scheme is self sustainable for a measure M1 if the following
feasibility constraint holds:
G(yx) E[Φ(x; x)−x | x ≤ yx] ≥ (1−G(yx)) E[x−Φ(x; x) | x > yx] (16)
First notice that (16) does not depend neither upon M1, nor upon e  0.
Use the deﬁnition of average tax
E[Φ(x; x) − x | x ≤ yx] =
R yx
x [Φ(x; x) − x]dG
G(yx)
(17)
and the deﬁnition of average subsidy:
E[x − Φ(x; x) | x > yx] =
R x
yx[x − Φ(x; x)]dG
1 − G(yx)
(18)
Replace the last two equations into (16), simple algebra shows that feasi-
bility holds if
bs ≥ (1 − ρ)x + ρxe
i.e. the transfer scheme is self-sustaining for a measure M1 of lineages
depending on G(x).
Intermediate cost of investment. If ˜ x ∈ ∆x notice that agents with x > ˜ x
will not invest, therefore the policymaker can devise a tax transfer scheme
such that wealth is taxed above ˜ x and subsidy is below ˜ x and still preserve
investment opportunities in wealthy lineages (those with b > ˜ x). Replicating
the same argument as in the previous proof we conclude that a permanent
tax transfer scheme satisfying feasibility constraints in each period exists if
G(y˜ x) E[Φ(˜ x; x)− ˜ x | x ≤ y˜ x] ≥ (1−G(y˜ x)) E[˜ x−Φ(˜ x; x) | x > y˜ x] (19)
once again the condition does not depend upon M1; Using the deﬁnition of
average tax and subsidy get
E[Φ(˜ x; x) − ˜ x | x ≤ y˜ x] =
R y˜ x




E[˜ x − Φ(˜ x; x) | x > y˜ x] =
hR ˜ x
y˜ x[˜ x − Φ(˜ x; x)]dG +
R x
˜ x [˜ x − bs]dG
i
1 − G(y˜ x)
(21)
Then replacing (20) e (21) into (19) we get the sufﬁcient condition:
bs ≥ (1 − ρ   G(˜ x)) ˜ x + ρ   G(˜ x)   E[G | x ≤ ˜ x]
46for a permanent tax transfer scheme to be feasible avoiding decline for a
subset of agents with positive measure. ￿
Proof of Corollary 1.
Observe now that when the sufﬁcient condition for self sustainable redis-
tributive schemes holds with strictly inequality in either of the two cases
above, the policymaker can use the surplus of tax revenues to subsidez a
fraction of (1−M1) agents in the second round. For the new mass of invest-
ing agents the sufﬁcient condition also holds with strictly inequality, then the
policymaker can further extend the measure of subsidized lineages and so
on. ￿
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